Colombia Defence and Security Report Q2 2008

The key security development in Colombia in Q108 has been a significant decline in public favour for the EU recognised terrorist organisation Fuerrzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). This change of mood has been reflected in large scale protests throughout Colombia and a raft of smaller protests by expatriate Colombians around the world. FARC derives the bulk of its finances from drug smuggling and its key modus operandi is hostage taking for the purposes of extortion. Hostages are typically imprisoned in the jungles of Colombia for years on end. FARC's highest profile hostage is Ingrid Betancourt, a French-Colombian who was abducted in 2002 whilst standing for office in the presidential elections. It is unclear whether a waning of public support will translate into a decrease in the prominence of FARC - in essence the sheer profitability of its drug smuggling operations are likely to keep it viable. That said, occasional deadly altercations with the Colombian army are having some success at eliminating key FARC figures and may serve to weaken the organisation. In late October 2007, for instance, FARC commander Martin Cabellero, along with 18 other rebels, died in a battle with the Colombian army.

In this climate, negotiations between the Colombian government and FARC remain, unsurprisingly, tense. Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez has joined the negotiating table, acting as mediator between the Colombian government and FARC. The move is extraordinary given the long-term tensions between Venezuela and Colombia, and unsurprisingly, the step has been a mixed blessing as well as something of an on again, off again affair. On the one hand the process has secured the likely release of three hostages by FARC. On the other hand, Chvez has displayed support for FARC, arguing that it should not be regarded as a terrorist organisation. The upshot is that Chvez is in a powerful position. This is made all the more clear by the fact that Chvez could all but crush FARC by clamping down on the passage of its cocaine to the rest of the world, via Venezuela, but has thus far resisted such a move.

Likewise, negotiations with the country's other key guerrilla organisation Ejercito de Liberacin Nacional (ELN) are still faltering despite the release of nine hostages by ELN. In mid-October, the International Crisis Group (ICG) released a report, Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN, which suggested that the peace negotiations between the government and the ELN face failure unless substantial bottlenecks are overcome. The ICG suggested that a cease-fire is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for peace. 'The ELN should release kidnap victims, de-mine some areas, make more information available and propose a model for ceasefire implementation and verification. The Uribe administration should be more flexible on a complete cessation of hostilities and the concentration and identification of ELN troops in a ceasefire.

Norway, Spain and Switzerland should consider offering expertise on ceasefires and related matters.' Peace talks have yet to reach agreement despite the release of the hostages.

Colombia's indigenous arms industry is small, but is looking to expand sales throughout South America and, indeed, further afield. As compared to other countries in the region, Colombia hasn't experienced an economic boom. Chile, for instance, has profited substantially from a rise in global copper prices.

Meanwhile Brazil has benefited substantially from the discovery of the giant Tupi oil field, which is estimated to increase Brazil's oil reserves by some 50%. In the case of Chile and Brazil these great cash injections have been invested, in large measure, into improving national security and defence, thereby boosting the local arms industries. Colombia has not been the beneficiary of a similar boom, although it has received significant foreign aid from the US in the interests of curtailing the illegal production of narcotics within its borders.